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1
Introduction
Around 3:00 A.M. on November 22, 2003, the then Republican Speaker of the
House, Dennis Hassert, announced that there would be a recorded vote on the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act. The bill, if passed, would be
the largest and most dynamic Medicare bill in three decades. The vote was scheduled to
last fifteen minutes. A little less than three hours later the vote closed with the
Republicans winning the longest recorded vote in Congressional history, 220-215
(Cusack, 2005). Several events during this vote were quite curious and odd, a
Congressional investigation followed by a reprimand was even held to determine if
Republican leadership had crossed the line into bribery in their attempts to persuade a
defiant party member (Cusack, 2005).
Of the many anecdotes to come out of this vote, none is more awkward than the
account of Representative Jo Ann Emerson, a Republican from Missouri. Emerson voted
against the legislation and due to the demand of leadership, could not leave the chamber.
When the first tallies were taken and the Republicans were losing, leadership sent aids to
find Emerson in order to persuade her to change her vote. Emerson, however, was no
where to be found. Emerson, in order to avoid negotiations and pressures from
leadership, had gone over to the Democrat’s side of the aisle and was kneeling and hiding
between desks (Cusack, 2005). She managed to elude her leadership long enough to keep
her no vote without substantial pressure.
What would make a member of Congress act in such a manner? Emerson, for
ideological and electoral reasons, did not want to support the bill. Emerson, however, was
a safe member. She won 71.8% of the votes form her district in the 2002 mid term

2
election. Republican leadership knew this and that her re-election chances would not be
damaged too much by a yes vote. Leaders sought her out knowing they could get an
additional vote without running the risk of losing a seat. Because of Emerson’s
clandestine ploy, leadership did not get the support they wanted and needed from her.
This paper examines the party support of congressmen and presents a theory of
support that is conditional on electoral security. The situation above reveals many things:
leaders have certain perks and or punishments that they can use to negotiate with, leaders
seek out a safe member while others were allowed to maintain their no vote with little
negotiation from leaders and members are aware of the punishment and power of leaders
and seek to avoid them, even by taking drastic measures. The theory presented here
suggests that leaders demand more support from safe members and less from vulnerable
members and that safe members have more motivation than vulnerable members to
support leaders. The party will have its greatest benefit when safe members offer more
support than vulnerable members and leaders demand more support from safe members.
In the example above, Rep. Emerson was hiding because she knew leadership
would be extremely demanding of her because she was safe. They would not have taken
an ideological or electoral excuse for defiance from Emerson and could easily punish her
for her offence. The theory presented here states that it is rational and beneficial for
leaders to demand more support from safe members and for safe members to give more
support to leaders than vulnerable members do. This theory is built on the evidence and
suggestions from other theories on Congress and partisan support and helps to reconcile
seeming contradictions that appear in the literature.
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Literature Review and Theory
The account of the 2003 Medicaid reform bill reveals the occasionally harsh and
somewhat quirky behavior of congressmen. This account also shows the intense
negotiations that occur between members and leaders. A review of the existing literature
on Congress, congressmen, and partisanship in Congress is now used to show the
motivations of both party members and leaders, and why these motivations help predict
the actions and behaviors of congressmen. This literature review will reveal several
things: members want (even if through force or incentives) to support their party, leaders
want support from their members and possess incentives to force support, and increasing
levels of party support harm members electorally. These results lead to a situation of
conditional party support on the part of members and conditional loyalty demands on the
part of leaders.
Mayhew (1974) argues that congressmen are, for all practical purposes, “singleminded re-election seekers.” According to Mayhew, all actions of congressmen are
designed to help that member get re-elected. While congressmen may have actions that
achieve other goals, the primary focus of all actions and goals of congressmen is
obtaining re-election, for as Mayhew argues, without re-election, no other secondary goal
of congressmen can be obtained. Mayhew’s theory places the decisions and actions of
congressmen in the hand of the constituency, since they are the ones who hold the power
to re-elect.
Other scholars take issue with Mayhew. Dodd (1977) believes that most
congressmen are concerned with re-election only early in their career. Dodd theorizes
that it is a congressman’s innate desire for power that motivates his actions in Congress.
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Congressmen eventually grow tired of constantly seeking re-election, and once they feel
they are electorally safe enough, they start to climb the “power ladder” (Dodd 1977). All
congressmen need to affect, or display power over, public policy so they conform to
congressional norms, which may hurt re-election chances, and attempt to get on
prestigious committees (Dodd 1977). Congressmen then seek to become committee
leaders and then party leaders in order to obtain more power (Dodd 1977).
Aldrich and Rohde (2001) argue that policy goals and desires motivate the actions
of congressmen, not just re-election. Aldrich and Rohde state that making good public
policy is a large determinate of the actions of congressmen. Good policy is a goal of
congressmen whether it leads to electoral gains or not. According to Aldrich and Rohde,
congressmen have both electoral and policy goals, each of which shapes their decisions
and actions.
According to some scholars, political parties also motivate congressmen’s actions
(Cox and McCubbins 1993 & 2005; Rohde, 1991; Aldrich and Rohde 2001). This
argument, however, is hotly debated in the Congressional literature. Several scholars
argue that parties rarely, if ever, effect the actions of congressmen (Mayhew, 1974;
Kingdon, 1981; Krehbiel 1993 & 1998). The literature on party motivators of
congressmen will be reviewed in order to determine how and if parties might affect
congressmen’s behavior.
Mayhew (1974) argues that parties offer congressmen very little in their reelection efforts, thus, parties hardly effect congressmen’s action. Kingdon (1981) shows,
through survey data of congressmen and their staff, other actors, such as constituency and
fellow members, influence congressmen vote choices much more than party. Parties are
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more likely to affect congressmen’s decisions when the president is of the same party, the
issue at hand is on the presidential agenda, and constituency and fellow members are
indifferent to the vote (Kingdon, 1981). Krehbiel (1993) argues that all congressional
actions and outcomes are decided by the preferences of congressmen, particularly the
preferences of the members at what he deems pivot points. Krehbiel (1998) also argues
that parties are simply a collection of similar preferences and in order to prove partisan
effects on congressmen, partisan effects must be shown to trump preferences. Parties are
based on the preferences of congressmen and these preferences influence parties and their
makeup. Parties do not influence the preferences of congressmen (Krehbiel 1993 &
1998).
In contrast, two other theories suggest that parties do influence the actions of
congressmen. According to the Conditional Party Government theory (CPG), parties
influence congressmen when inter-party heterogeneity and intra-party homogeneity are
high (Rohde 1991; Aldrich and Rohde 2001). Under the right conditions, members of
congress allow party leaders to discipline them and influence their voting decisions
(Rohde 1991; Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Aldrich 1995). While CPG predicts partisan
effects are conditional, Procedural Cartel theory predicts that partisan effects in Congress
are constant (Cox and McCubbins 1993 & 2005). Cartel argues that the negative agenda
setting powers, the ability to keep bills off the agenda, of majority party leadership in the
House always allow for the majority party to wield influence over the legislative
outcomes in Congress (Cox and McCubbins 1993 & 2005).
Cox and McCubbins (1993) also introduce the public party record. Public records
are the overall national perception of the party and the policy they enact (Cox and
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McCubbins 1993). Cox and McCubbins show that parties undergo electoral swings,
periods in time when all members of a party are either helped or hurt electorally by their
party association. This finding gives credence to their argument that the public, through
whatever means, has general feelings about the party and holds individual members
electorally accountable for these feelings. Individual members must ensure their party
has the best possible public record in order to maximize their re-election chances of
themselves and all the members in their party (Cox and McCubbins 1993).
Members want to support their party for several reasons. First, members are
willing to give support to receive certain perks that leaders have to offer. Members may
obtain preferred committee assignments, election help, expedited legislation and other
various perks from leaders for support (Cox and McCubbins 1993 & 2005). Second,
members also want to lend support in order to avoid the punishment of leaders. Leaders
can withhold committee assignments and legislative support from members and generally
make achieving anything in Congress more difficult for members who are not loyal (Cox
and McCubbins 1993 & 2005). Third, members lend loyalty to help the party record. A
good party record helps all party members electorally and can be improved by parties
passing favorable legislation, which is made easier by support from members. Members
have incentives to support their party and may willingly choose to do so (Cox and
McCubbins 1993 & 2005).
Support, however, decreases a member’s chance at re-election. Canes-Wrone et
al. (2002) show that the more ideologically extreme a member is, the smaller their vote
margins will be. Likewise, they also show that there is an inverse relationship between a
member’s likelihood of re-election and his ideological extremeness. Carson et al. (2006)
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show explicitly that both higher levels of party unity and more extreme ideologies have a
negative effect on vote margins and re-election chances. Bell and Roberts (2005) show
that members who are electorally vulnerable are more likely to defect from the party
position, indicating that these members are indeed scared of the electoral consequences of
voting the party position, so they vote in accordance with their constituency. While the
authors of these findings may not ascribe to a non-partisan or weak-partisan theory, their
results do appear to confirm that high levels of party support do not aid in helping
congressmen attain their goal of re-election.
Congressmen are cross-pressured between two goals: re-election and party
support. Congressmen settle this internal conflict by determining how electorally safe
they are. Safe members need not worry about re-election, thus they are electorally free to
support their party. Safe members have no constraints at the ballot box, leaving them
free to gain the perks offered by leaders. While this increased party support might hurt
safe members, they do not worry about defeat, just lower margins. The perks leadership
gives members in return for loyalty compensates for the lower margins received from
increased support.
Vulnerable members, however, do not have this luxury. They cannot risk lower
margins so they cannot increase their support to the party. Vulnerable members must
choose the electorally safe route just in order to survive. Despite vulnerable members’
personal goals or policy desires, or the amount of support they want to give their party,
they simply cannot due to the electoral risk. Vulnerable members must choose reelection over party support.
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This creates a situation where a member’s level of support is conditional on their
electoral security. If members feel they can afford the hit at the polls for increased
loyalty, they will gladly support party leaders and collect the rewards for doing so.
Vulnerable members cannot afford the hit at the polls, thus they will not increase their
loyalty to leaders. The primary theory of this paper is that the amount of loyalty
members offer leaders is conditional on the degree to which members feel electorally
safe.
Moving on to the motivations of leaders, Cox and McCubbins (1993) argue that
majority party leaders in the House have three goals: re-election, majority maintenance,
and re-selection. Re-election means they simply want to be re-elected as individual
members of House. Majority maintenance means that leaders wish to keep their majority
status in the House, thus they seek re-election for all of their rank-and-file members. Reselection means leaders wish to be re-elected to their leadership positions. Leaders want
policy support from their members to produce a better public record, which should help
them maintain the majority and achieve re-selection. Leaders have certain tools at their
disposal to influence members to support their position (Cox and McCubbins 1993).
Party leaders are motivated by the three goals established by Cox and McCubbins (1993)
and assuring that party members are loyal to their cause can help them achieve their
goals.
Scholars show that leaders, in seeking their goals, act in rational and strategic
ways. King and Zeckhauser (2003) show that party leaders in the House use vote
options, not vote buying, to get their members to vote with them. These vote options are
more efficient and reliable than vote buying and indicate the strategic planning of party

9
leaders (King and Zeckhauser 2003). Pekkanen et al. (2006) show that in Japan leaders
strategically place members in committees or positions based on their electoral situation.
Safe members are placed in the hierarchy of leadership and vulnerable members are
placed in committees that help their vote margins (Pekkanen et al. 2006). This creates a
situation where leaders do not have to worry about re-election because only members
who are safe are allowed to start on the path to leadership. These findings show that
party leaders are strategic in obtaining their goals and use their powers in ways that
enhance their chances of success.
Thus, leaders are cross-pressured as well. Leaders need support to ensure a good
public record and to achieve their policy goals and possess the tools to ensure loyalty
from members (Cox and McCubbins 1993). Leaders, however, must also maintain their
majority, a task that is hindered by demanding high support from members because
support decreases the individual re-election chances of members. Demand for loyalty
from individual party members, thus, is also conditional on the electoral security of
members.
Leaders demand a higher degree of loyalty from safe members. Leaders know
that safe members can bear the electoral burden of high support and will force safe
members to be loyal. This benefits both sides. Leaders get the loyalty they desire
without running a large risk of losing their majority. Safe members, despite the hit at the
polls, get rewards from leadership and the perks of a better party record, which can
compensate for the initial hit at the polls. Leaders expect to receive a high level of
support from safe members and will punish less supportive safe members more severely.
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Leaders also know that vulnerable members cannot afford support and are willing
to run the risk of losing seats by forcing loyalty from vulnerable members. Leaders will
not, however, severely punish vulnerable members for lack of support because doing so
would increase the risk of losing the majority. Again, both sides benefit from this
arrangement. Leaders have a better chance at keeping the majority than they would from
an absolute demand of loyalty from all members. Vulnerable members benefit because
they are relieved of the pressure from leaders and can focus solely on re-election.
Safe members run a minimal chance an electoral defeat from offering more
support and are compensated for their generosity; thus, they act rationally in giving extra
support to leaders. Increased support helps procure a better party record, which is
theoretically good for all party members, and helps members achieve individual positions
that aid in re-election. Vulnerable members benefit from their resistance to party support.
Leaders are not strict with them so vulnerable members can solely focus on their reelection efforts. Vulnerable members have less pressure from leadership for support and
the hit to the party record from their lack of support is normalized by extra support from
safe members. Vulnerable members act rational by not increasing support to their party.
Leaders treat vulnerable and safe members conditionally in their demands for
support and are benefited by doing so. Ideally, leaders maintain their majority and obtain
support, which increases the chances of a good record, by having conditional demands
for loyalty. Leaders act completely rational using the electoral security of members as a
condition for their demands for support. This theory suggests that the different demands
on party leaders force them to treat safe and vulnerable members differently and that this
is a rational action by leaders and is beneficial to both leaders and members. Leaders
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need support to obtain their goals, yet it is individually harmful to members, therefore,
leaders must strategically treat safe and vulnerable members different.
Recent evidence shows that leaders are more concerned with support on
procedural votes than they are with final passage votes (Sinclair 2002; Cox and
McCubbins 1993 and 2005; Jenkins et al. 2005). Leaders use procedures and rules to
make it much easier to get what they want (Cox and McCubbins 1993 and 2005) so it is
the votes that determine these rules and procedures that leaders focus on the most.
Leaders demand more support on procedural votes because they need rules to achieve
their desired outcomes. Members support procedural votes more because these votes are
more likely to go unnoticed by constituencies, removing the electoral restraint of reelection from their decision. Thus, support for procedural votes remains more constant,
while support for final passage votes varies with electoral security and other possible
factors. This creates a situation where vote margins impact the amount of support
members give on final passage votes more than support on procedural votes. The theory
presented here leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Partisan support of majority party member is positively and
significantly related to the vote margins they receive.
Hypothesis 2: Vote margins for majority members will have a greater effect on
final passage votes than on procedural votes.
The existing literature states very little about the effects of minority parties and
party leaders on their membership so no hypotheses will be made about minority parties.
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Methods
To test the hypotheses of this paper, an OLS regression will be used. Three
different dependent variables will be used in three separate regressions. The data is
collected from the 96th to 101st Congress. The first dependent variable is the overall party
support a member gives his party. Party support is measured as the percent of times a
member supports their party divided by the number of opportunities a member had to
support their party on partisan votes. Partisan votes exist when a majority of one party
votes against the majority of the other party. The second dependent variable is a
member’s party support on final passage partisan votes. The third is a member’s party
support on procedural votes. The data used in determining procedural and final passage
were gathered from the Roll Call Voting Data Set 83rd – 108th Congress compiled by
David Rohde and were calculated using the same method as Jenkins et al. (2005).
The independent variables are defined as follows:
Vote Margin – The percent of the two-party vote a congressman received in the
last election. This variable is not used by itself in the model. It is interacted with a
dummy for majority members to test how electoral security effects party, procedural and
final passage support.
Majority Vote – An interaction between vote margin and majority. This is the
key independent variable for testing the hypotheses proposed above. In order to obtain
support for Hypothesis 1, a positive and significant result is needed for this variable. For
support for Hypothesis 2 a larger coefficient or more significant result is needed in the
final passage support regression than in the procedural support regression.
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Minority Vote – An interaction between vote margin and the inverse of majority.
Even though no predictions about minority parties are made this variable is still included
as a control. Leaving this variable out could lead to biased results because it is unknown
exactly how minority party vote margins affect support of members of any partisan
status. The results could be quite revealing about how electoral security of minority
members affect their partisan support.
Extreme – The absolute value of a member’s DW Nominate Score. This is used
to test the ideological extremity of congressmen. The variable is expected to be positive
and significant.
Party Distance – The Euclidian distance between a member’s DW Nominate
score and his party’s average DW Nominate score. This measures how far a
congressman’s ideology is from his party’s average or, in other words, how ideologically
different a member is from his party. It is suspected that as distance increase support will
decrease because members are less likely to support parties they are distant from.
District Presidential Vote – The percent of the two-party vote that the
presidential candidate of the member’s party received in the congressional district in the
last presidential election. This is used to control for district ideology. District ideology
has been shown to play a big role in the decisions of congressmen (Mayhew 1974;
Kingdon 1981). Members want to vote with their district, usually meaning there will be
an inverse relationship between party support and district ideology.
Tenure – The number of consecutive years a member has served in the House
before the start of the Congress. This is a standard control for party support and will be
implemented into the models. An inverse relationship is expected between tenure and
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party support because usually tenured members need to rely on their party less so they do
not need the perks that come along with support.
Rules – A dummy variable with a one indicating a member was on the Rules
Committee. This variable stems from Cox and McCubbins (1993 & 2005). Using their
logic, if a member is on the Rules Committee, they must have been loyal to the party to
receive such a position. The relationship between Rules and support is expected to be
positive, however, being on Rules may not increase because these members already have
such high levels of support.
Chair – A dummy variable with a one indicating a member held a committee
chair. This variable is included for the same reasons as the Rules Committee variable.
Democrat – A dummy variable with a one indicating a member was a Democrat.
This is used to control for differences between the two parties. Democrats were in the
majority for most of the time frame used in the models, which may have unpredictable
results.
Unopposed - A dummy variable with a one indicating a member was unopposed
in their prior election. This variable is expected to have a negative relationship with
dependent variable because the security of unopposed members is accounted by Vote
Margin. Unopposed members are not necessarily safe, they could be vulnerable members
who have no current electoral threat.
Majority - A dummy variable with a one indicating a member belonged to the
majority party. This is used as an interaction with vote margin to create the primary
independent variable for the models. The theory only makes predictions regarding the
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majority party, so this variable is quite important. The inverse of this variable and Vote
Margin is used to create the Minority Vote variable.
Congress – A time variable indicating the Congress in which the measurements
were taken. This shows how party support changes over time.
Fixed effects by Congress are controlled for in all models.
Results
The results of Table 1 are quite interesting. Regression 1 shows that the Majority
Vote variable indicates that every one percent increase in vote margins increases party
support by .094%, for majority members. This result is much more revealing when
viewed in light of the actual range of the party support variable. The lowest support
given by a member in the data set is .013%. A simple one percent boost in votes
increases this member’s support to .112%, still low but a noticeable improvement. If this
member were to gain five percent more of the votes in an election, his support score
would be .483%, supporting his party nearly half of the time, a large improvement for an
easily obtainable electoral result. Likewise, if members who are completely supportive
of the party, several whom appear in the dataset, have a five percent decrease in vote
margins their support would drop to .53%. These members would go from always
supporting leaders to support on slightly over half of the votes. These results show that,
all else equal, electoral security impacts party support greatly. Majority Vote is positive
and significant, lending support to Hypothesis 1. This finding reveals that as majority
party members become safer, they support the party more. This finding is in complete
alignment with the theory of this paper, which predicts that congressmen will be more
supportive of their party, for several reasons, when they are more electorally safe.
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Table 1.
The Effects of Electoral Security on Party, Procedural,
and Final Passage Support
(96th – 101st Congresses)

Independent Variables
Majority Vote
Minority Vote
Extreme
Party Distance
District Presidential Vote
Tenure
Rules
Chair
Democrat
Unopposed
Majority
Congress
Constant

R2
N
F
Note:

Regression 1:
Party Support

Regression 2:
Procedural Support

Regression 3:
Final Vote Support

0.094
(0.017)***
0.029
(0.017)*
0.594
(0.010)***
-0.553
(0.021)***
-0.001
(0.000)***
-0.001
(0.000)***
0.003
(0.006)
0.009
(0.005)**
0.038
(0.002)***
-0.022
(0.006)***
0.012
(0.011)
0.007
(0.000)***
0.018
(0.058)

0.060
(0.015)***
0.007
(0.015)
0.463
(0.010)***
-0.487
(0.022)***
-0.001
(0.000)***
-0.001
(0.000)***
0.005
(0.005)
0.014
(0.014)***
0.015
(0.002)***
-0.018
(0.005)***
0.001
(0.010)
0.005
(0.001)***
0.251
(0.054)***

0.026
(0.020)
0.070
(0.020)***
0.658
(0.013)***
-0.657
(0.021)***
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.014
(0.006)*
-0.001
(0.006)
0.038
(0.003)***
-0.012
(0.007)*
0.136
(0.014)***
0.004
(0.004)***
0.111
(0.070)

0.754
4619
480.260***

0.710
4663
333.690***

0.748
4663
471.650***

Standard Errors are in parentheses, fixed effect by Congress are controlled for.
*p<.1**p<.05 ***p<.01 Two-Tailed Test
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Even though not predicted by the literature of this theory, similar results are
revealed for minority party members. The Minority Vote variable is positive and
minimally significant. Regression 1 suggest that as vote margins increase by one percent,
party support increases by .029%, for minority members. This finding needs to be
explored more fully. The results of Regression 1 indicate that congressmen, majority or
minority members, increase their support as their electoral security rises. The
conditionality of party loyalty for majority members, as predicted in this paper, gathers
basic support from Regression 1.
Regression 1 shows that as members become more ideologically extreme, they are
more likely to support their party. A one-point increase in the absolute value of a
member’s DW Nominate Score predicts a .594% increase in support. This is an expected
result as extreme members are more likely to support their party.
The results for Party Distance in Regression 1 show that as a member’s DW
Nominate score moves away from his party’s median by one point, he decreases his party
support by .553%. This result is not surprising, it is completely expected that as a
member becomes more ideologically removed from his party, he will support the party
less.
Regression 1 also shows that as their district’s ideology becomes more extreme,
congressmen party support decreases. This is indicated by the significant and negative
result on the District Presidential Vote variable. As a district’s vote for the presidential
candidate of a congressman’s party increases by one percent, their party support
decreases by .001%. This is an expected finding.
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Regression 1 shows that the longer a congressmen is in the House, the less
supportive of their party they are. The Tenure variable is negative and significant and
shows that for every year a congressman is in the House, they decrease their loyalty by
.001%. While this effect is small, over the course of a Congressional career it could be
quite drastic.
The Rules Committee variable is insignificant indicating that being a member on
this specific committee has no effect on party support at all. Being a committee chair,
however, does increase party support. Regression 1 indicates that being a committee
chair increases party support by .009%. This does support the argument of Cox and
McCubbins (1993) that leaders reward loyal members.
Being a Democrat increase party support by .038%. This is a rather interesting
finding, and more research needs to be conducted to find out why one party is more loyal
than the other. This result may be due to the time frame of this study; the Democrats
were the majority for most of the time period of these regressions.
Being unopposed decreases a member’s loyalty by .022%. This is also an
expected result, as being unopposed does not necessarily indicate security. Unopposed
members usually fear a tough election following being unopposed thus they may feel
vulnerable and thus lower their support in order to boost electoral gains.
The Majority variable in Regression 1 is insignificant indicating that being a
member of the majority, in and of itself, does not affect loyalty. This variable, however,
when interacted with vote margin, does have an affect on loyalty.
The Congress variable is significant and indicates that with each passing, during
the time frame of this study, party support increases by .007%.
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The Majority Vote variable for Regression 2, which test loyalty on procedural
votes, is also positive and significant. As a majority party member’s vote margins
increase by one percent, his loyalty on procedural votes increase by .06%. This provides
general support for the theory presented in this paper; safer members are more likely to
support their party on procedural votes.
The Minority Vote variable is insignificant in Regression 2 indicating that
electoral security has no effect on procedural vote support for minority party members.
Extreme is positive and significant in Regression 2. This variable reveals that a
one-point increase in extremism increases procedural support by .463%. Once again, this
result is surprising for the same reasons listed above.
Similar results are found for party distance in Regression 2 as in the first. As
congressmen move one-point further away from their party, their loyalty on procedural
votes decreases by .487%. This is also an expected result.
In Regression 2 both District Presidential Vote and Tenure are significant and
negative indicating similar result as Regression 1. The effects of these variables are in
the expected direction. Similar results from Regression 1 exist for Committee Chair,
Democrat, Unopposed and Congress. Rules Committee and Majority are insignificant
again as well.
Regression 3 tests loyalty on final passage votes. The relationship between final
passage loyalty and majority party security is not significant. This is an utterly
unexpected result and somewhat contradicts the theory of this paper. As noted above, for
Hypothesis 2 to be supported the significance and coefficient of this variable needs to be
higher. Neither one of these conditions occur. This poses a problem for my theory
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because it shows that support on procedural votes are not as stable as suspected and that
little variation occurs for majority support on final passage. While this result does refute
Hypothesis 2 it should not imply an overall rejection of my theory. The difference
between final passage and procedural votes is a small part of my theory. The larger and
more important part of the theory is that electoral security affects party support. All
results of Table 1 support this overall point of my theory.
Regression 3 varies from the other two in that it has some different significant
variables. District Presidential Vote, Committee Chair and Tenure are insignificant while
Rules Committee and Majority have become significant. These are curious findings.
Why do certain variable affect overall and procedural support but not final passage
support? This phenomenon needs to be more fully examined.
Overall, the models perform well. The R2 for each regression is high and
indicates that a large majority of the variance of the different types of support is
explained. Hypothesis 1 is supported through Regression 1, providing basic support for
the theory of this paper. Hypothesis 2, however, is not supported, questioning the logic
of the theory regarding procedural and final passage votes.
Discussion
The results of Regression 1 support Hypothesis 1 and lend general support to the
overall theory. These results indicate that as congressmen become more electorally
secure, they are more supportive of their party. While the methods above may not test
exactly why this relationship occurs, it does support the notion that safe members are
more supportive.
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This finding reveals a great deal about how the congressional world works.
Congressmen like their jobs and want to keep them, thus they do not want to harm their
chances of re-election by supporting their party (Mayhew 1974, Canes-Wrone et al.
2002). Safe members, however, can afford the hit at the polls and leaders do not risk
much by forcing safe members to be loyal, leading to the relationship Regression 1
presents, high security increases loyalty.
While the general conditional theory of party loyalty is supported, some specifics
of the theory are not. Regressions 2 and 3 indicate that electoral security does not have a
greater effect on final passage votes than procedural votes. The theory predicts almost
the exact opposite of the result of these two regressions. The expectation is that final
passage votes would be positive and significant to a greater degree than procedural votes.
This relationship is expected because leaders always want members to be procedurally
loyal, regardless of security. This, however, is not the case. Electoral security has little
statistical effect on final passage loyalty. This result is unexpected and difficult to
explain. The literature (Sinclair 2002; Cox and McCubbins 1993 and 2005; Jenkins et al
2005) suggests what the theory predicts; yet the models give almost no statistical support,
and even refute, this inclination. Much more research is needed to determine why this
relationship is opposite of what is predicted and why does security affect procedural
support, and to such a greater degree. This finding does pose some specific problems to
my theory.
Another curious finding is that the Minority Vote is positive and significant with
overall support and final passage support. My theory makes no predictions about this
relationship so this finding does not support or refute my theory. This finding is
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unexpected because the literature states so little about the loyalty of minority party
members. Table 1 shows that minority members become more supportive overall and on
final passage votes as they become more secure. This indicates that minority members
are acting in the exact way prescribed by my theory. This result needs more
examination. Do minority members become more supportive as security rises for the
same reasons as majority members? Why does this relationship not exist for procedural
votes? Further research will help to better explain this phenomenon that the existing
literature does not discuss.
Overall, my theory of conditional party support based on electoral security is
supported. Certain aspects of the theory, such as the difference between procedural and
final passage results, need to be reconsidered and examined further. The results of this
paper, however, indicate that as majority party members become more secure they
support their party more, which is the main point and assertion of my theory. My
findings provide an overall explanation of how and why congressmen act the way they
do. My theory picked up where other left off and helped to reveal more on the actions of
congressmen.
The 2003 Medicaid detailed above revealed actions, sometimes strange or harsh,
of congressmen and leadership. Through the theory and results of this paper, these
actions are more easily understood. Why do party leaders succeed or fail in their
negotiations with their members? Parties leaders have tools to make members follow
their command, however, as this paper shows, leaders will be able to garner more loyalty
when the member they are negotiating with are safe. How do leaders determine with
whom they enter negotiations with? My theory predicts that leaders will enter into
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negotiations with safe members more often. These negotiations may become more
heated because leadership knows safe members can afford support and will demand more
loyalty from them. Why do party members choose to appease or defy the wishes of
leadership? Members take their electoral security into account when deciding whether or
not to support leaders, the safer they are, the more likely they are to support leaders.
The theory of this paper, and the motivations of members and leaders used to
design it, goes a long way in explaining why members do or do not support their party
and in which situation members demand support. Leaders demand support from safe
members and let vulnerable members slide. Members will support leaders more when
they are electorally safe. This situation is strategic and beneficial for all involved and is
supported by the results of this paper. Simply put, party loyalty among majority party
members is conditional on electoral security.
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